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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Saleem Bey appeals the order of the District Court 
dismissing the habeas corpus petition he filed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  He contends that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance for failing to object to: (1) a faulty jury 
instruction on eyewitness testimony (Kloiber instruction); and 
(2) the prosecution’s comments on his post-Miranda silence. 
Bey concedes that his claims are procedurally defaulted, but 
argues his default should be excused because his post-
conviction review counsel’s assistance was ineffective when 
he failed to raise the claims in collateral proceedings. For the 
following reasons, we conclude there is cause to excuse Bey’s 
procedural default for his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim pertaining to the Kloiber instruction. We will vacate the 
District Court’s order and remand for issuance of a 
conditional writ based on that claim. Accordingly, we need 
not reach Bey’s claim pertaining to the prosecution’s 
comments on his post-Miranda silence.  
 
I 
 
Bey was charged with the nonfatal shooting of 
Kenneth Thompkins and the fatal shooting of Terry Swanson 
that took place on November 21, 2001 in a club parking lot in 
Philadelphia. Bey’s first trial ended in a hung jury. On retrial, 
Bey was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and 
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possessing an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to life in 
prison for murder, 7.5 to 40 years for attempted murder, and 9 
to 18 months for the weapons offense.  
 
The prosecution’s key witness at the retrial was 
Philadelphia Police Officer Daniel Taylor. Taylor testified 
that he saw Bey running from the direction of the first 
gunshots in the south end of the parking lot and that Bey shot 
Thompkins from behind with a silver handgun as he ran. 
Taylor said that he then saw Thompkins fall to the ground as 
Bey continued running north toward Taylor. According to 
Taylor, Bey tucked the handgun into his waistband as he ran. 
Taylor testified that when Bey was about fifteen feet away 
from him, Taylor shouted “police, drop the gun” and Bey 
looked up in response.1 Taylor then made “eye-to-eye” 
contact with Bey as Bey “looked right at [Taylor’s] face.”2 
Taylor then gave chase with several other officers, and Bey 
was arrested moments later. No weapons were found on Bey, 
though a .380 silver gun—which matched the bullet casings 
at the scene—and a black and silver Derringer handgun were 
found elsewhere in the parking lot. Officer Ferrero testified 
that he saw Bey drop the Derringer as he ran from police.  
 
Taylor’s identification of Bey as the shooter was 
certain and unequivocal. Taylor said he could see Bey clearly: 
There were no cars or people obstructing his view, and the 
area was “well lit.”3  Taylor’s identification of Bey as the 
shooter was consistent in all of Taylor’s interviews, 
preliminary hearings, at the initial trial, and at the retrial that 
occurred after the first jury was unable to reach a verdict. 
However, Taylor was the only eyewitness who identified Bey 
as the shooter. Other officers on the scene at the time of the 
shooting testified that they understood Bey to be the shooter 
because Taylor identified him as such. Kenneth Thompkins, 
the surviving victim, testified that he did not see his shooter. 
However, in statements to Bey’s then-defense counsel, 
                                                 
1 J.A. at 172. 
2 J.A. at 173.  
3 J.A. at 195.  
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Thompkins had said that his shooter was not Bey, but a bald, 
dark-skinned, bearded man.  
 
During the retrial, defense counsel requested a special 
jury instruction on eyewitness testimony, pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 
Kloiber.4 In Kloiber, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recognized the need for a cautionary instruction in certain 
eyewitness cases.5 The trial judge here did attempt a Kloiber 
charge. However, rather than giving the charge outlined in 
Kloiber, the court instructed the jury as follows:   
Where a witness is positive of his identification, 
such as where the opportunity for positive 
identification is good and the witness is positive 
in his identification and the identification has 
not been weakened by any prior failure to 
identify but remains even after cross-
examination positive and unqualified, the 
testimony as to the identification may not be 
received with caution. Indeed, positive 
testimony as to identity may be treated as a 
statement of fact. 
 
On the other hand, if you believe that a witness 
is not in a position to clearly observe and was 
not in a position because of lighting and/or 
conditions, then you may use that as a factor in 
determining whether or not that the person 
actually had the opportunity to observe that 
which he testified to and a positive 
identification of a defendant by one witness is 
sufficient for a conviction.6  
 
Although the bold text in the quoted instruction is critically 
inconsistent with Kloiber, defense counsel did not object. In 
                                                 
4 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954). 
5 Id. 
6 J.A. at 1027 (emphasis added). 
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Kloiber, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had actually stated 
the following:  
Where the opportunity for positive 
identification is good and the witness is 
positive in his identification and his 
identification is not weakened by prior 
failure to identify, but remains, even after 
cross-examination, positive and 
unqualified, the testimony as to 
identification need not be received with 
caution—indeed the cases say that “his 
[positive] testimony as to identity may be 
treated as the statement of a fact.” For 
example, a positive, unqualified 
identification of defendant by one witness 
is sufficient for conviction even though 
half a dozen witnesses testify to an alibi. 
 
On the other hand, where the witness is not 
in a position to clearly observe the 
assailant, or he is not positive as to identity, 
or his positive statements as to identity are 
weakened by qualification or by failure to 
identify defendant on one or more prior 
occasions, the accuracy of the 
identification is so doubtful that the Court 
should warn the jury that the testimony as 
to identity must be received with caution.7  
 
The difference between telling jurors that they “may 
not” receive an identification with caution and instructing 
them that they “need not” receive the identification with 
caution is the difference between telling jurors that they must 
accept an identification and telling them that they may accept 
the testimony without reservation, but they need not do so.  
 
                                                 
7 Kloiber, 106 A.2d at 826–27 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
6 
 
The confusion sewn by this instruction was soon 
evident. During deliberations, the jury asked the court to 
clarify aspects of Officer Taylor’s testimony. The jury asked 
the court: “[M]ay we have or hear the transcript of Officer 
Taylor’s testimony describing from the time the officer heard 
the first shot to when the defendant ran west towards the 
wall?” and “May we also have [the] statement where Officer 
Taylor says he saw the defendant shoot Swanson?”8  Both 
questions went unanswered. 
 
The jury ultimately convicted Bey of the murder of 
Terry Swanson, attempted murder of Kenneth Thompkins, 
and possessing an instrument of crime. Thereafter, Bey filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Pennsylvania’s 
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).9 His appointed PCRA 
counsel raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
based on the Kloiber instruction, but failed to highlight the 
“may not be received with caution” language. Instead, Bey’s 
PCRA counsel challenged three other aspects of the 
instruction. Counsel argued the instruction: (1) failed to 
inform jurors that if they found circumstances casting doubt 
on the identification’s accuracy, the testimony “must be 
received with caution,” thereby omitting language from 
Kloiber; 10 (2) impermissibly placed a burden on the defense 
to prove circumstances casting doubt on the accuracy of the 
identification; and (3) improperly instructed jurors that 
“positive testimony as to identity may be treated as a 
statement of fact.”11 
 
The PCRA Court considered only the third of the 
Kloiber issues raised in the petition, holding that the 
“statement of fact” language was permissible under state law 
and as a result, trial counsel’s assistance was not ineffective 
                                                 
8 J.A. at 1041, 1048.  
9 42 Pa. Const. Stat. § 9541, et seq. 
10 106 A.2d at 826.  
11 J.A. at 62–64.  
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for failing to object to the instruction.12 The Court thus denied 
the PCRA petition, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
thereafter affirmed the PCRA court’s conclusions.13 Bey 
sought leave to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court but 
that request was declined.14  
  
Bey then filed this petition for habeas corpus relief, 
alleging, among other things, that his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was violated by his trial counsel’s failure to object 
to the “may not be received with caution” language of the 
Kloiber instruction. Bey also argues that his PCRA counsel’s 
failure to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim 
on collateral review amounted to a Sixth Amendment 
violation that excuses any procedural default at the PCRA 
appeal level.  
 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation that Bey’s claims be rejected.15 The District 
Court held generally that to the extent that Bey’s ineffective 
assistance claims were not procedurally defaulted, Bey could 
not show prejudice because “there was overwhelming 
evidence of guilt.”16 We thereafter certified the following two 
issues for appeal: (1) Whether Bey’s trial attorney’s 
assistance was ineffective for failing to object to a faulty 
Kloiber instruction and whether any procedural default of this 
issue should be excused; (2) Whether Bey’s trial attorney 
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object on proper 
grounds to the prosecutor’s comments on Bey’s post-arrest, 
post-Miranda silence and whether the procedural default of 
that issue should be excused. As we noted at the outset, since 
                                                 
12 Commonwealth v. Bey, Nos. CP-51-CR-1206691-
2001, CP-51-CR-1209051-2001, slip op. at 4, 11–12 (Phila. 
Ct. Com. Pl. July 26, 2011).  
13 Id. at 2; Commonwealth v. Bey, 53 A.3d 922 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2012) (unpublished table decision). 
14 Commonwealth v. Bey, 67 A.3d 792 (Pa. 2013). 
15 Bey v. Folino, No. CIV.A. 13-5848, 2015 WL 
4130358, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2015). 
16 Id. at *1 n.1. 
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we are granting relief on the Kloiber ineffectiveness claim, 
we do not reach Bey’s claim based on the prosecution’s 
closing argument.17  
 
II 
 
  “The doctrine of procedural default prohibits federal 
courts from reviewing a state court decision involving a 
federal question if the state court decision is based on a rule 
of state law that is independent of the federal question and 
adequate to support the judgment.”18 Bey concedes that both 
of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 
procedurally defaulted. However, a habeas petitioner’s 
procedural default may be excused if the petitioner can show 
cause for the default and prejudice arising from failure to 
consider the claim.19 If cause and prejudice are shown and the 
default excused, our review of a petitioner’s claim is de novo 
because the state court did not consider the claim on the 
merits.20 On the other hand, if a constitutional claim is 
properly raised in state court—and therefore, not procedurally 
defaulted—the state court’s determination is afforded 
                                                 
17 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 and 2254. We have appellate jurisdiction to review 
the certified issues under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.   
18 Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 187 (3d Cir. 2008). A 
state procedural rule is “independent” if it is not interwoven 
with federal law or dependent upon a federal constitutional 
ruling. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983). A 
state procedural rule is “adequate” if it was “firmly 
established and regularly followed” at the time of the alleged 
procedural default. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 
(1991).  
19 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 
(1982). 
20 Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 710 n.4, 715 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
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substantial deference under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).21  
 
A 
 
We must first determine if Bey’s claim is procedurally 
defaulted. Procedural default occurs when “the prisoner ha[s] 
failed to meet a state law procedural requirement.”22 
Pennsylvania’s procedural rules state that a defendant waives 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless he or she 
raises it during the first state collateral review proceeding.23 
 
Bey concedes that his PCRA counsel failed to argue 
that his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective in failing to 
object to the Kloiber instruction that the jury “may not . . . 
receive[] with caution” positive eyewitness testimony. Bey 
therefore acknowledges that his claim is procedurally 
defaulted. Nevertheless, he argues that the default should be 
excused. In rejecting that position, the District Court reasoned 
that because the PCRA petition generally raised 
                                                 
21 Under AEDPA, federal courts may grant habeas 
relief only if a state court’s adjudication “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
22 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). 
23 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 
2002) (“[A]ny ineffectiveness claim will be waived only after 
a petitioner has had the opportunity to raise that claim on 
collateral review and has failed to avail himself of that 
opportunity.”). See also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b) (PCRA 
petitioners are time-barred from raising claims after one year 
of the final judgment). We have held that this state procedural 
rule is independent of the federal question and adequate to 
support the judgment. Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 409 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
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ineffectiveness claims based on issues with the Kloiber 
charge, Bey’s counsel did raise this claim to state courts.24 
Accordingly, the Court applied deferential AEDPA review 
and held that the state courts reasonably rejected the Kloiber 
ineffectiveness claim and Bey was therefore not entitled to 
habeas relief.25  
 
Bey’s PCRA petition did claim ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on a faulty Kloiber instruction, and argued 
that as a basis for the objection under the state and federal 
constitutions. But none of the three Kloiber issues raised in 
the petition pertain to the claim Bey is raising here or the 
language it is based on. As noted above, the current objection 
challenges the trial court’s instruction that positive and 
unqualified eyewitness testimony “may not be received with 
caution.”26 Though Bey’s petition and the PCRA Court’s 
opinion reprint the problematic phrase, Bey’s counsel made 
no argument about it, and the court did not consider that 
language in adjudicating Bey’s PCRA claim.27 Accordingly, 
we conclude that the specific ineffective assistance claim 
addressing the trial court’s instruction that the jury “may not . 
. . receive[]” positive identification testimony with caution 
was not raised in state court and was therefore waived under 
state law. Consequently, Bey’s claim is procedurally 
defaulted and we may only review it if the default can be 
excused. 28 
                                                 
24 Bey, 2015 WL 4130358, at *15 n.4. 
25 Id. at *15–16. 
26 As outlined above, the PCRA petition raises only the 
following issues: (1) the instruction failed to inform jurors 
that if a factor was present that cast doubt on the accuracy of 
the eyewitness’s perception, then the testimony “must be 
received with caution” (omitting language from Kloiber) (2) 
the instruction improperly placed the burden on the defense to 
prove the presence of those factors, and (3) the instruction 
improperly told jurors that positive identification “may be 
treated as a statement of fact.” J.A. at 60–65. 
27 Bey, slip op. at 11–12.  
28 Frady, 456 U.S. at 167–68. 
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B 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez 
v. Ryan,29 counsel’s failure to raise an ineffective assistance 
claim on collateral review may excuse a procedural default if: 
“(1) collateral attack counsel’s failure itself constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, and (2) the 
underlying ineffective assistance claim is ‘a substantial 
one.’”30 Because Bey’s claim that his PCRA counsel’s 
assistance was ineffective stems from the strength of his 
underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, we 
consider the second Martinez requirement first.  
 
To satisfy the second Martinez requirement, the 
petitioner must “demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one.”31 In 
other words, “the [petitioner] must demonstrate that the claim 
has some merit.”32 In Martinez, the Court relied upon Miller–
El v. Cockerell,33 suggesting that we apply the standard for 
issuing certificates of appealabililty in resolving the inquiry 
into what constitutes a “substantial” claim.34 Thus, whether a 
claim is “substantial” is a “threshold inquiry” that “does not 
require full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced 
in support of the claims.”35 With this framework as our guide, 
we can now turn to an analysis of Bey’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.  
 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland v. Washington,36 a petitioner must prove “(1) that 
his counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, it fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that 
                                                 
29 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
30 Glenn, 743 F.3d at 409–10 (quoting Martinez, 566 
U.S. at 14). 
31 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. 
32 Id. 
33 537 U.S. 322 (2003). 
34 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. 
35 Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 327, 336. 
36 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his client,”37 i.e., 
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”38 We have previously referred to these as the 
“performance” and “prejudice” prongs of the Strickland test.39  
 
Generally, trial counsel’s stewardship is 
constitutionally deficient if he or she “neglect[s] to suggest 
instructions that represent the law that would be favorable to 
his or her client supported by reasonably persuasive 
authority” unless the failure is a strategic choice.40 As noted 
above, Bey’s trial counsel failed to object to a Kloiber charge 
that blatantly misstated the wording in Kloiber itself. A 
proper charge under Kloiber informs the jury that it has the 
ultimate discretion of deciding whether to credit positive 
eyewitness testimony.41 Instead, the trial court’s instruction 
essentially required the jury to accept positive eyewitness 
testimony as true by directing that “testimony as to the 
identification may not be received with caution.”42 The fact 
                                                 
37 Albrecht, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–92). 
38 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
39 See, e.g., Glenn, 743 F.3d at 409. 
40 Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 514 (3d Cir. 2002). 
See also Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 258 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Given our discussion of the nature of the defect in this 
charge, and the problems that arise from it, it follows a 
fortiori that unless counsel had a strategic reason for not 
objecting, [the petitioner] will satisfy the first prong of 
Strickland.”) 
41 Kloiber, 106 A.2d at 826 (“Where the opportunity 
for positive identification is good and the witness is positive 
in his identification and his identification is not weakened by 
prior failure to identify, but remains, even after cross-
examination, positive and unqualified, the testimony as to 
identification need not be received with caution . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
42 J.A. at 1047 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the 
Appellees argue that because the transcript of the trial was 
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that the jurors were told that they only had to accept the 
identification if it was made under favorable circumstances 
and was not equivocal does not negate the fact that the jury 
did not know that it was free to reject Officer Taylor’s 
identification even if Taylor was positive as to his 
identification. The instruction is likewise contrary to 
Pennsylvania’s Suggested Jury Instruction that was based on 
Kloiber. The edition of the suggested instruction available at 
the time of Bey’s trial directs the jury to weigh positive 
eyewitness testimony as follows: “you need not receive the 
testimony with caution; you may treat it like ordinary 
testimony.”43 
 
Although Kloiber and its progeny did not specifically 
prohibit the instruction given here at the time of Bey’s 
retrial,44 the trial court’s deviation from the language in 
                                                                                                             
riddled with errors, it is therefore possible that the words 
“may not” were mis-transcribed and the judge did instruct the 
jury that they “need not” receive the testimony with caution. 
Appellees’ Br. at 36 n.13. Because Appellees have presented 
no evidence to support this utterly speculative claim, we need 
not respond to it.  
43 Pa. Bar Inst., Pa. SSJI § 4.07 (Crim.) (1st ed., rev. 
1985).   
44 Kloiber’s requirements were not focused on 
identification problems when the witness had a clear view of 
the defendant and was consistent in his or her identification. 
Rather, Kloiber was primarily concerned with providing 
special instructions to caution the jury when an eyewitness 
did not have a clear opportunity to view a defendant, 
equivocated on the identification of the defendant, or had 
some difficulty making an identification in the past. Kloiber, 
106 A.2d at 826–27; Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 303 
(Pa. 2010) (“Under Kloiber, ‘a charge that a witness’[s] 
identification should be viewed with caution is required 
where the eyewitness: (1) did not have an opportunity to 
clearly view the defendant; (2) equivocated on the 
identification of the defendant; or (3) had a problem making 
an identification in the past.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. 
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Kloiber was so problematic that any alert defense counsel 
should have immediately known that it raised serious 
constitutional issues. Jurors were basically told that they had 
to accept the only eyewitness identification of the defendant 
as fact; they were not free to question it if they found Officer 
Taylor had a good opportunity to observe and was certain of 
his identification. Those are clearly relevant factors in 
evaluating the identification, but they were certainly no 
guarantee as to the accuracy of Taylor’s identification of 
Bey.45 The charge removed the discretion that the jury could 
otherwise have exercised that may have raised a reasonable 
doubt in the mind of one or more jurors about the identity of 
the shooter. Moreover, as we explain below, the instruction’s 
deviation from Kloiber reaches constitutional dimensions.   
 
A jury instruction deprives a defendant of his or her 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when it suggests a 
                                                                                                             
Gibson, 688 A.2d 1152, 1163 (Pa. 1997))). Furthermore, 
Pennsylvania law gives trial courts broad latitude in phrasing 
its instructions. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 
1247 (Pa. 2006). We note, however, that after Bey’s trial, 
Kloiber’s lack of concern with positive eyewitness testimony 
was cast into doubt by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, which specifically 
questioned “misconceptions” such as the “infallibility of 
eyewitness identification” and “the correlation between 
certainty and accuracy.” 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014). 
45 See Nat’l Research Council, Identifying the Culprit: 
Assessing Eyewitness Identification 15 (2014) (noting that 
human perception is not only susceptible to external limits 
such as lighting conditions but also “can be heavily 
influenced by bias and expectations derived from cultural 
facts, behavioral goals, emotions, and prior experiences with 
the world”); James Michael Lampinen et al., The Psychology 
of Eyewitness Identification 172–86 (2012) (noting that even 
though people generally believe that confident eyewitnesses 
are accurate, the degree of confidence an eyewitness 
possesses is malleable and even confident eyewitnesses can 
be mistaken). 
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conclusive presumption that removes the prosecution’s 
burden of proving an element of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.46 If a “reasonable juror could have 
understood the [instruction] as a mandatory presumption that 
shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on [an] 
element” of the offense, the instruction is constitutionally 
defective.47 However, a single jury instruction “may not be 
judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the 
context of the overall charge.”48  
 
Here, the prosecution was obviously required to 
establish that Bey—and no one else—fatally shot Swanson 
and wounded Thompkins. Officer Taylor’s testimony that he 
saw Bey running from the direction of the Swanson shooting 
and that he saw him shoot Thompkins, if accepted, 
established Bey’s guilt. The trial court then told the jury that 
positive eyewitness testimony “may not be received with 
caution” when “the opportunity for positive identification is 
good” and “the identification has not been weakened by any 
prior failure to identify but remains even after cross-
examination positive and unqualified.”49 Based on this 
instruction, a reasonable juror could only have concluded that 
he or she was required to accept Officer Taylor’s testimony as 
true as long as Taylor’s identification was positive and 
consistent. Thus, as long as Officer Taylor’s testimony was 
consistent and he testified he was certain Bey was the shooter, 
a guilty verdict would necessarily result—regardless of 
whether the testimony was accurate. The scientific 
community has understood for decades that eyewitness 
identifications that are certain and confident are not 
necessarily accurate.50 Rather, a witness may honestly hold 
                                                 
46 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–24 
(1979). 
47 Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 316 (1985). 
48 Boyde, 494 U.S. 370, 378 (1990) (quoting Boyd v. 
United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926)). 
49 J.A. at 1027. 
50 See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council, Identifying the 
Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 31 (2014) 
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beliefs about what he or she saw that are distorted, inaccurate, 
or even completely wrong.51 Accordingly, under established 
Supreme Court precedent, Bey has a substantial claim that the 
faulty Kloiber instruction deprived him of his due process 
right to have the prosecution prove every element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
 
Appellees argue that there is no due process problem 
here because in the context of the instructions as a whole, the 
jury could not have reasonably believed that it was required 
to accept Officer Taylor’s testimony as true.52 We realize, of 
course, that the jury charge included general instructions on 
evaluating the credibility of witnesses. For example, the 
jurors were told that they “must consider and weigh the 
testimony of each witness and give it the weight that you 
                                                                                                             
(“Research has cast doubt, for instance, on the belief that the 
apparent certainty displayed in the courtroom by an 
eyewitness is an indicator of an accurate identification . . . .”); 
Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and 
Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence–Accuracy 
Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 Psychol. 
Bulletin 315, 315–16, 323–24 (1995) (noting that the 
correlation between accuracy and confidence in eyewitness 
identifications is “weak at best”); Elizabeth F. Loftus, 
Eyewitness Testimony 19 (1979) (“[E]yewitness testimony is 
likely to be believed by jurors, especially when it is offered 
with a high level of confidence, even though the accuracy of 
an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not be 
related to one another at all.”). 
51 See The Innocence Project, Reevaluating Lineups: 
Why Witnesses Make Mistakes and How to Reduce the 
Chance of a Misidentification 3 (2009) (estimating that 
eyewitness misidentifications have been a factor in 75% of 
the wrongful convictions that were subsequently overturned 
by DNA evidence); James Michael Lampinen et al., The 
Psychology of Eyewitness Identification 5 (2012) (explaining 
that police lineup data shows that eyewitnesses identify a 
non-suspect as the culprit at least 20% of the time). 
52 Appellees’ Br. at 40–42. 
17 
 
think in your own personal judgment it is fairly entitled to 
receive.”53 Appellees rely on this to argue that the error was 
harmless.  We disagree.  
As we have explained: “[W]hile a single defect does 
not necessarily make an instruction erroneous, . . . other 
language in the instruction does not always serve to cure the 
error. This is so even when other language correctly explains 
the law.”54 Specifically, “a defect in a charge may result in 
legal error if the rest of the instruction contains language that 
merely contradicts and does not explain the defective 
language in the instruction.”55 Here, the misstated Kloiber 
instruction that positive eyewitness testimony “may not be 
received with caution” neither explained nor acknowledged 
the general instruction that the jury “must consider and weigh 
the testimony of each witness.” Rather, the Kloiber 
instruction directly contradicted the general instruction by 
instructing the jury not to weigh the testimony that was most 
critical to establishing Bey’s guilt. In this context, a jury 
would have reasonably concluded that positive eyewitness 
testimony was an exception to the general rule, and that this 
category of testimony was entitled to special deference if the 
eyewitness’s identification was positive and unqualified. 
Indeed, such an instruction would be consistent with 
generally held assumptions that eyewitnesses are accurate and 
trustworthy.56  
                                                 
53 J.A. at 1017–18.  
54 Whitney, 280 F.3d at 256 (citing Francis, 471 U.S. 
at 322). See also Everett, 290 F.3d at 512 (“The mere fact that 
the law was correctly stated in one part of the charge will not 
automatically insulate the charge from a determination of 
error.”).  
55 Whitney, 280 F.3d at 256 (citing Francis, 471 U.S. 
at 322).  
56 See Timothy P. O’Toole et al., District of Columbia 
Public Defender Survey, Champion, April 2005, at 28–29 
(concluding that jurors overestimate eyewitnesses’ ability to 
recall an event despite the limitations of memory and as a 
result, “jurors often believe mistaken eyewitnesses”); 
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 19 (1979) (“All 
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 Clearly, this instruction could be reasonably 
understood as requiring the jury to accept an eyewitness’s 
identification of Bey as the shooter. Indeed, that was what the 
jurors were told. We can think of no strategic reason for 
defense counsel not to object to a charge that raises such due 
process concerns. Nevertheless, Appellees try to argue that it 
was strategic and reasonable for Bey’s trial counsel not to 
object to the instruction because Bey’s attorney requested the 
Kloiber instruction, and under the circumstances of the case, 
he was “lucky to have received one.”57 This argument is 
frivolous. Neither legal authority nor common sense supports 
an argument that defense counsel would not object to an 
erroneously-worded charge that raises such grave 
constitutional concerns merely because the charge was given 
pursuant to defense request. We therefore conclude that Bey’s 
trial counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland. 
 
Bey likewise establishes that he was prejudiced by the 
instruction. Prejudice requires a showing that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”58 A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”59 The prejudice 
standard “is not a stringent one” and is “less demanding than 
the preponderance standard.”60 However, a petitioner must 
show “not merely that the errors at his trial created a 
possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 
constitutional dimensions.”61 
                                                                                                             
evidence points rather strikingly to the conclusion that there is 
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who 
takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 
‘That’s the one!’”).  
57 Appellees’ Br. at 42.  
58 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
59 Id.  
60 Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
61 Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. 
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Appellees argue that because “[t]he eyewitness 
identification was sure” and the bullets in the victims’ bodies 
matched the gun found at the scene, “the Commonwealth 
presented an overwhelming case that Bey was guilty,” and 
Bey was not prejudiced by the instruction. We again disagree.  
 
At the first trial, nearly identical evidence resulted in a 
hung jury. A hung jury can signal that the outcome of a case 
was close and support a finding that an error on retrial 
prejudiced a convicted defendant. 62 For example, in Ouber v. 
Guarino, the First Circuit found it significant that “two 
different [prior] juries found the prosecution’s case so 
evanescent that they were unable to reach a verdict” when 
analyzing whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the 
defendant in his third trial.63 Likewise, in Alston v. Garrison, 
the Fourth Circuit noted that “hung juries the first two times 
[the defendant] was tried” indicated that the prosecution’s 
“evidence [was] not so airtight” and led to the conclusion that 
“the representation rendered by [the defendant’s] court-
appointed attorney grossly violated the defendant’s sixth 
amendment rights.”64 Furthermore, in analogous situations, 
even a single prior hung jury has been deemed sufficient to 
indicate that the case was close and an error on retrial was not 
harmless.65 Here, the fact that Bey’s first jury was unable to 
                                                 
62 E.g., Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir. 
2002); Alston v. Garrison, 720 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 1983).  
63 293 F.3d at 33. 
64 Alston, 720 F.2d at 817. 
65 United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 525 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (concluding that failure to admit evidence was not 
harmless error in part because “when the [previous trial] court 
allowed the inquiry, a hung jury resulted”); United States v. 
Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We cannot 
characterize the error as harmless, because the hung jury at 
the first trial persuades us that the case was close and might 
have turned on this evidence.”). Cf. Breakiron v. Horn, 642 
F.3d 126, 147 n.18 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Strickland prejudice and 
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reach a verdict after hearing Taylor’s unequivocal 
identification strongly suggests that the evidence was not 
nearly as “overwhelming” as the state would like us to 
believe.  
 
Furthermore, the jury’s deliberations in the second trial 
also support our conclusion that the second jury did not think 
this was the “slam dunk” that the state claims. The jury’s 
questions specifically focused on Officer Taylor’s testimony. 
First, the jury asked: “[M]ay we have or hear the transcript of 
Officer Taylor’s testimony describing from the time the 
officer heard the first shot to when defendant ran west 
towards the wall[?]”66  Second, and even more to the essence 
of the error here, the jury asked: “May we also have [his] 
statement where Officer Taylor said he saw the defendant 
shoot Swanson?” Thus, despite arguments to the contrary, 
Taylor’s testimony may well have been a source of concern.  
 
More importantly, it is because Taylor’s identification 
appears positive and unequivocal that the Kloiber instruction 
so undermined the integrity of the trial. Taylor’s testimony fit 
into the precise category of evidence that the jury was 
required to accept. Taylor’s testimony was positive: he had a 
clear view of Bey, making “eye-to-eye” contact with him in 
the “well lit” parking lot from fifteen feet away.67 Taylor’s 
testimony was also unqualified: he never wavered in his 
identification of Bey as the shooter in all of his interviews, 
preliminary hearings, or in either trial. As a result, to obtain a 
verdict of guilty the prosecution only needed to show: (1) that 
Taylor was certain the shooter was Bey; and (2) that Taylor’s 
identification was not otherwise weakened by circumstances 
such as poor lighting or the inability to see. There was no 
room for any juror to conclude that Taylor, though certain, 
was wrong. Accordingly, the prosecution was 
                                                                                                             
Brecht harmless error are essentially the same standard.” 
(quoting Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 139) (brackets omitted)). 
66 J.A. at 1041. 
67 J.A. at 173, 195.  
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unconstitutionally relieved of its burden of proving that Bey 
was the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Nor can we say that other evidence presented at Bey’s 
retrial would have resulted in Bey’s conviction had the jury 
been given a correct instruction and chosen to disbelieve 
Taylor’s identification. Indeed, Taylor’s identification was 
the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case. All other police 
officers at the scene believed Bey to be the shooter because 
Taylor identified him as such. The surviving victim’s 
testimony was inconsistent and unreliable—he testified that 
he didn’t see his shooter, but at other times said his shooter 
was not Bey. No one but Taylor claimed to see Bey with the 
weapon that matched the bullets at the scene—the silver 
0.380 handgun.  
 
Thus, in light of the importance of Officer Taylor’s 
eyewitness testimony in this case, and the fact that Bey’s 
previous trial resulted in a hung jury, we conclude that Bey 
was prejudiced because of his trial counsel’s failure to object 
to the faulty Kloiber charge. The questions the second jury 
had about Taylor’s testimony also strengthen our conclusion. 
Therefore, we hold that Bey can show his underlying 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is a substantial 
one under Martinez.  
 
To excuse his procedural default, Martinez also 
requires that Bey show that his counsel on collateral review 
rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland.68 As 
discussed above, in Pennsylvania, it is PCRA counsel’s 
responsibility to raise any ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims to avoid forfeiting them under state law.69 Since 
collateral review with new counsel is the first possible 
instance in which to raise claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, PCRA counsel’s failure to raise an 
                                                 
68 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14.  
69 Grant, 813 A.2d at 738. 
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ineffectiveness claim in the initial petition means that “no 
state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”70  
 
As we noted above, the three Kloiber claims that Bey’s 
PCRA counsel raised failed to include or refer to the language 
requiring the jury to accept testimony that Bey was the 
shooter. While we have no record of why PCRA counsel 
would have chosen to omit an ineffectiveness argument based 
on the language at issue here, we can think of no strategic 
reason why counsel would do so, and the state has not offered 
any viable explanation for such a glaring omission. 
Accordingly, we agree with Bey that his PCRA counsel’s 
performance was deficient under Strickland and that Bey was 
prejudiced by PCRA counsel’s omission. Bey’s case, 
therefore, fits into the narrow category of cases outlined in 
Martinez, and his procedural default is excused as to his 
ineffectiveness claim based on the faulty Kloiber jury 
instruction.  
 
C 
 
Because Bey has shown cause and prejudice to 
overcome his procedural default, we now consider the merits 
of his claim.71 Given what we have already said, resolution of 
the merits requires little additional discussion. We need not 
repeat the numerous reasons why the Kloiber jury instruction 
violated Bey’s due process rights. For the same reasons Bey’s 
Sixth Amendment claim is “substantial” under Martinez, Bey 
is able to sustain his burden of showing that his trial counsel’s 
assistance was ineffective for failing to preserve a claim that 
has obvious merit. Accordingly, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order denying his petition and remand with 
instructions to issue a conditional writ. Because we grant 
relief based on Bey’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
pertaining to the Kloiber issue, we need not consider his 
                                                 
70 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10. 
71 Id. at 17 (“A finding of cause and prejudice . . . . 
allows a federal court to consider the merits of a claim that 
otherwise would have been procedurally defaulted.”). 
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ineffectiveness claim based on the prosecution’s closing 
statements. 
 
III 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order denying habeas relief and remand with 
instructions for the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas 
corpus.  
